EASA updates GNSS jamming and spoofing guidance, citing spike

Responding to the rapid rise in global navigation satellite system (GNSS) jamming and spoofing events, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has updated its guidance to industry stakeholders in a bid to enhance vigilance and mitigation.

EASA’s newly revised Safety Information Bulletin (SIB), which warns that spoofing and jamming events are growing in both “severity” and sophistication, comes on the heels of the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration’s publication in March of an updated Interference Resource Guide for aircraft operators and pilots concerning GNSS/GPS jamming and spoofing. The FAA and EASA documents feature recommendations but are not formal policy.

Both regulators have observed since 2022 a “notable increase” in GNSS jamming and spoofing, particularly in regions surrounding conflict zones and other sensitive areas. EASA cites the Mediterranean, Black Sea, Middle East, Baltic Sea, and the Arctic. Pilots need to be particularly vigilant in areas around eastern Europe, the Black Sea and the Eastern portion of the Mediterranean Sea, according to the FAA.

Spoofing and jamming events lead to operational challenges for aircraft and ground systems. Consequently, as part of its list of recommendations for key stakeholders including air navigation service providers, air traffic management providers, and aircraft and equipment manufacturers, EASA continues to urge air operators to use alternative navaids to verify the aircraft’s position when operating in proximity to the affected areas.

Position verification can be accomplished via various non-GNSS procedures and solutions. And this is certainly where the sensor-based, autonomous inertial navigation system (INT) in aircraft avionics plays a key role.

To that end, prominent INT supplier Honeywell Aerospace — which recently spun off from Honeywell — said after attending a joint EASA-IATA workshop on GNSS jamming and spoofing that it’s developing advanced inertial systems, anti-spoofing receivers, surveillance systems resilience, smart antennas, and multi-sensor fusion solutions to detect, mitigate and help operators recover from GPS jamming and spoofing.

Notably, as part of their respective new guidance, EASA and the FAA also see an opportunity for the pilot’s tablet-based electronic flight bag (EFB) to be used as part of mitigation efforts.

FAA suggests that an EFB or computer tablet with a separate GPS input and moving map software may aid in detecting jamming and/or spoofing, while EASA notes that it supports the use of Type B EFB applications that use near real-time data to present a recent view of radio frequency interference along the route as it “can allow better anticipation from the crew.”

The prospect of using formal EFB-based applications to address GPS spoofing and jamming syncs nicely with the work that was conducted at the EASA-IATA workshop last year. There, attendees shortlisted EFB apps as part of a list of ‘high-impact near-term and longer-term steps to improve resilience against jamming and spoofing,’ as reported by Honeywell senior director offering management Simon Innocent in an online post.

It’s also timely given the work underway at Iridium Communications, which is in the process of being acquired by aerospace manufacturer and launch service provider Rocket Lab. Iridium reckons that the tiny PNT ASIC chip needed to receive its global Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite network-powered PNT service — which is a resilient and encrypted backup to GNSS/GPS — could arrive on flight decks as carry-on equipment via the pilot’s EFB, and later be integrated with avionics, such as the INT.

It also believes that its value added manufacturers, of which Honeywell Aerospace is one, could in the future integrate the ASIC into their satcom boxes for Iridium services, ensuring that a solution that’s “1,000 times more powerful” than GPS is readily available.

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